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Abstract—Software-defined networking (SDN) eases network
management by centralizing the control plane and separating
it from the data plane. The separation of planes in SDN,
however, introduces new vulnerabilities in SDN networks since
the difference in processing packets at each plane allows an
adversary to fingerprint the network’s packet-forwarding logic.
In this paper, we study the feasibility of fingerprinting the
controller-switch interactions by a remote adversary, whose aim
is to acquire knowledge about specific flow rules that are installed
at the switches. This knowledge empowers the adversary with a
better understanding of the network’s packet-forwarding logic
and exposes the network to a number of threats. In our study,
we collect measurements from hosts located across the globe
using a realistic SDN network comprising of OpenFlow hardware
and software switches. We show that, by leveraging information
from the RTT and packet-pair dispersion of the exchanged
packets, fingerprinting attacks on SDN networks succeed with
overwhelming probability. We also show that these attacks are
not restricted to active adversaries, but can be equally mounted
by passive adversaries that only monitor traffic exchanged with
the SDN network. Finally, we discuss the implications of these
attacks on the security of SDN networks, and we present and
evaluate an efficient countermeasure to strengthen SDN networks
against fingerprinting. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness
of our countermeasure in deterring fingerprinting attacks on SDN
networks.
Index Terms—Software-defined networking, OpenFlow, Fin-
gerprinting, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING (SDN) [14], [27]eases the development and deployment of network ap-
plications by defining a standard interface between the con-
trol plane and the data plane. In SDN, the control plane
is implemented by a logically centralized controller, which
interacts over a bi-directional communication channel with
the data plane’s network devices. The controller can query
devices for their state, e.g., to acquire traffic statistics or
information about the status of the switches’ ports, and modify
their forwarding behavior, by installing and deleting flow rules.
Network devices can also notify the controller about network
events (e.g., the reception of certain packets) and device’s state
changes. For example, a number of advanced reactive control
plane logic implementations [11], [17], [35], [46] configure
network devices to send notification to the controller according
to some installed policy (e.g., when a received packet does
not match any of the installed flow rules). This notification
triggers the controller to perform a series of operations, such
as installing the appropriate forwarding rules at the switches,
reserve network resources on a given network’s path, etc.
The separation of the control and data plane in SDN opens
the doors for a remote adversary to fingerprint the network.
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In particular, whenever packet forwarding is performed in
hardware, then packets at the data plane are processed several
orders of magnitude faster than at the software-based control
plane. This discrepancy acts as a distinguisher for a remote
adversary to learn whether a given probe packet is handled
just at the data plane or triggers an interaction between the
data plane and the control plane. An interaction provides
evidence that the probe packet does not have any matching
flow rule stored at the switch’s flow table (or it requires special
attention from the controller). This knowledge empowers an
adversary with a better understanding of the network’s packet-
forwarding logic and, as we outline in this work, exposes the
network to a number of threats. In spite of the plethora of SDN
security solutions in the literature [5], [15], [33], [39], [40],
[41], no contribution analyzes the feasibility and realization
of fingerprinting attacks on practical SDN deployments. More-
over, there are no proposed solutions to alleviate fingerprinting
attacks on SDN.
In this paper, we address this problem and study the
fingerprinting of controller-switch interactions by a remote ad-
versary with respect to various network parameters, such as the
number of hops in the communication path, and the data link
bandwidth. For that purpose, we collect measurements from
20 different hosts located across the globe (Australia, Asia,
Europe, and North America) using an SDN network compris-
ing of several OpenFlow hardware and software switches. Our
results show that, by leveraging information from the packet-
pair dispersion of the exchanged packets, fingerprinting attacks
on SDN networks succeed with overwhelming probability. For
instance, an adversary can correctly identify, with an accuracy
of 98.54%, whether a probe packet triggers the installation
of forwarding rules at three hardware switches in our SDN
network. Our results suggest that this fingerprinting accuracy is
only marginally affected by the number of hardware switches
that need to be configured on the path, and by the data
link bandwidth. More surprisingly, our results also show that
the presence of software switches, which process packets at
the software layer, does not hinder the ability of a remote
adversary in fingerprinting controller-switch interactions.
We also show that fingerprinting attacks can be mounted by
passive adversaries that, e.g., capture a snapshot of the traffic
exchanged with the SDN network. Although existing traffic
might not contain packet pair traces, our findings show that a
passive adversary can leverage the RTT of packets (that are
exchanged within a short time interval) to fingerprint the SDN
network with an accuracy up to 98.73%. The fingerprinting ac-
curacy due to the RTT of packets is, however, largely affected
by the SDN network size, and significantly deteriorates with
time.
This work extends our prior work in [2] (see Section VII for
a detailed explanation of our extensions). To the best of our
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2knowledge, this is the first complete work which quantifies—
by means of well defined metrics—the success of fingerprint-
ing attacks using state-of-the-art OpenFlow hardware switches.
We discuss the implications of our findings on the security
of SDN networks, and we show that fingerprinting attacks
can expose the SDN network to a number of new threats that
are not encountered in traditional networks. For instance, an
adversary that knows which packets cause an interaction with
the controller can, e.g., acquire evidence about the occurrence
of a particular communication event, or abuse this knowledge
to launch Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by overloading the
switches with bogus flow-table updates [22]. In light of our
findings, we present and evaluate an efficient countermeasure
to strengthen SDN networks against fingerprinting. Our evalu-
ation shows that our countermeasure considerably reduces the
ability of an adversary to mount fingerprinting attacks on SDN
networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we define our problem statement. In Section III, we
describe our setup, the performed experiments, and summarize
the collected data. In Section IV, we present and detail our
results. In Section V, we analyze the implications of our
findings on the security of SDN networks. In Section VI,
we present and evaluate an efficient countermeasure to deter
fingerprinting in SDN networks. In Section VII, we discuss
related work, and we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Before describing the focus of our work, we give a brief
refresher on OpenFlow, a widely deployed realization of SDN.
A. Background
SDN separates the control and data planes by defining a
switch’s programming interface and a protocol to access such
interface, i.e., the OpenFlow protocol [31]. The controller
leverages the OpenFlow protocol to access the switch’s pro-
gramming interface and configure the forwarding behavior
of the switch’s data plane. The communication between the
controller and switches is established using an out-of-band
control channel.
The core entities exposed by the OpenFlow switch’s pro-
gramming interface are flow tables and flow rules. A flow
table of a switch is just a container for its flow rules, which
define the switch’s forwarding behavior. The controller can
add, delete, or modify flow rules of a switch’s flow table by
sending an OFPT FLOW MOD OpenFlow message to the switch.
The parameters of an OFPT FLOW MOD message specify how
the flow table of the switch should be modified. A flow rule,
for instance, provides a semantic like “if a network packet’s
IP destination address is 1.2.3.4, then forward the packet to
port 2.” In general, a flow rule contains a match set that
defines the network packets to which the rule applies. It further
contains an action set that defines the actions that should
be applied to such packets, for example, forward to port 2.
Whenever a packet is received by a switch, the packet’s header
is used as a search key to retrieve the rule that applies to
the packet, by performing a lookup in the flow table. The
lookup operation compares the packet’s header with the rules’
match set to find the rule that matches the packet. Rules
are prioritized in case multiple rules match. For the cases
in which the controller needs to inspect a network packet,
before performing a forwarding decision and installing the
corresponding forwarding rules, OpenFlow defines a special
“forward to controller” action. When this action is applied to
a packet, the switch generates an OFPT PACKET IN message
that is sent to the controller. This message contains the original
packet and some additional information, such as the switch and
the port ID onto which the packet was received.
The OFPT PACKET IN feature is used in basic network
control logic implementations, such as the one of an Ethernet
learning switch. It is also used in more complex dynamic
control plane implementations. In both cases, the network
operates as follows: a packet received by the switch generates
an OFPT PACKET IN message; the controller receives and an-
alyzes the message to take a forwarding decision; the decision
is finally implemented by sending OFPT FLOW MOD messages,
which install rules at the relevant switches. This ensures that
all similar packets, i.e., those that belong to the same network
flow, are forwarded directly by the switches with no further
interactions with the controller. Note that the controller can
use barrier messages to ensure that message dependencies
are met, e.g., when multiple switches are reconfigured by
the controller for handling a new network flow. When a
switch receives a barrier request (OFPT BARRIER REQUEST),
the switch must finish all previously received messages before
processing new messages. After processing all messages, it
notifies the controller by sending a barrier reply message
(OFPT BARRIER REPLY).
B. Problem Statement
The main objective of our work is to study the ability
of a remote adversary to identify whether an interaction
between the controller and the switches (and a subsequent rule
installation) has been triggered by a given packet. The absence
of a controller-switch interaction typically provides evidence
that the flow rules that handle the received packet are already
installed at the switches. Otherwise, if a communication be-
tween the controller and the switches is triggered, then this
suggests that the received packet requires further examination
by the controller, e.g., since it does not have any matching
entry stored at the switch’s flow table, or because the controller
requires additional information before installing a forwarding
decision at the switches.
In our study, we consider both active and passive adver-
saries. We assume that an active adversary can compromise a
remote client, inject probe packets of her choice, and capture
the timing of the corresponding responses issued by a server.
In contrast, a passive adversary cannot inject packets in the
network but only monitors the exchanged traffic between the
server and the client. Notice that passive adversaries are hard
to detect by standard intrusion detection systems since they
do not generate any extra network traffic.
Our study focuses on answering the following questions:
• Is it possible to remotely identify whether the installation
of flow rules has been triggered by a given packet?
3• What is the accuracy of fingerprinting attacks in SDN
networks?
• What is the impact of the number of switches that need
to be configured on the fingerprinting accuracy?
• What is the impact of the data link bandwidth on the
fingerprinting accuracy?
• Is the fingerprinting accuracy affected by the presence of
software switches in the SDN network?
• How and to which extent can such fingerprinting attacks
be efficiently mitigated?
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we detail our experimental setup. This
includes a description of our testbed, the used features, the
conducted experiments, and the collected datasets.
A. Testbed
Our measurement setup is summarized in Figure 1. The
testbed comprises three OpenFlow hardware switches (three
NEC PF5240 switches [29]) and one OpenFlow software
switch (an OpenVSwitch, version 2.3.1 [32]). The switches
are connected to the data plane over a 100 Mbps data channel.
We also consider the case where the data channel bandwidth
increases to 1 Gbps. Note that, although our testbed only com-
prises three hardware switches, it can emulate the processing
of packets in many realistic datacenters. Recall that a conven-
tional datacenter’s network typically consists of three layers
of switches: top-of-rack, aggregation, and core [1]. Packets
are usually processed by at most one switch in each of these
layers, that is, each packet traverses (at most) three hops in
the datacenter’s network. The testbed’s switches interface with
a Floodlight v0.9 controller [12], which runs on a computer
with a 6-core Intel Xeon L5640 2.26 GHz CPU and 24 GB
of RAM. A legacy Ethernet switch bridges the connections
between the OpenFlow switches and the controller. To emulate
realistic network load on the control channel, we limit the
control interface of the switches to 100 Mbps.
The controller is configured to minimize the processing
delay for an incoming packet-in event, i.e., we only require the
controller to perform a table lookup and retrieve pre-computed
forwarding rules in response to packet-in events. Furthermore,
the controller always performs bi-directional flow installation;
that is, the handling of a packet-in event triggers the installa-
tion of a pair of rules, one per flow direction, at each involved
switch. We ensure that the controller’s CPU is not overloaded
during our measurements.
We deploy a cross-traffic generator on an AMD dual core
processor running at 2.5 GHz to emulate realistic WAN traffic
load on the switches’ ports that were used in our study. The
generated cross traffic follows a Pareto distribution with 20 ms
mean and 4 ms variance [7].
To analyze the effect of the data link bandwidth on the
fingerprinting accuracy, we bridge our SDN network to the
Internet using 100 Mbps and 1 Gbps links (respectively), by
means of a firewall running on an AMD Athlon dual core
processor 3800+ machine. For the purpose of our experiments,
we collect measurement traces between an Intel Xeon E3-1230
3.20 GHz CPU server with 16 GB RAM and 20 remote clients
deployed across the globe. Table I details the specifications
and locations of the clients used in our experiments. In our
testbed, the server and the software switch were co-located on
the same machine.
Note that, by reducing the time required for rule installation
to a minimum, our testbed emulates a scenario that is partic-
ularly hard for fingerprinting. In Section IV-C, we discuss the
implications of our setup on our findings.
B. Features
We define the network path Pcs between a client c and
a server s as a sequence of consecutive links Pcs =
〈L1cs , . . . , Lncs〉, which are connected via network compo-
nents. Similarly, we denote the reverse path Psc by Psc =
〈L1sc , . . . , Lmsc〉. We denote by τLi the transmission delay at
hop i; that is, τLi = SBLi , where S is the size of the packet
and BLi is the capacity of Li. Furthermore, let d
j
Li refer to
the additional delay that is experienced by packet j when
traversing Li. The delay djLi generally results from additional
queuing exhibited by packet j due to cross-traffic at hop i.
To identify a communication event between the switches
and the controller, we rely on two time-based features: packet-
pair dispersion and RTT.
1) Packet-pair Dispersion: The dispersion between two
packets sent by the client after a link Lics refers to the time
interval between the complete transmission of these packets on
Lics . When measuring the dispersion of a packet pair traversing
an SDN network, two cases emerge.
Case 1—Packets do not trigger rule installation:
Assuming that two probe packets (labeled in the sequel by
“1” and “2”) are sent by the client with an initial dispersion
∆0, and that they do not trigger any interaction on the control
plane, then the resulting dispersion measured after a link Lics
is given by [8], [18]:
∆i =
{
τLics + d
2
Lics
if τLics + d
1
Lics
≥ ∆(i−1)
∆(i−1) + (d2Lics − d
1
Lics
) otherwise.
(1)
In our setup, the client sends large packet pairs back-to-
back in time with an initial dispersion ∆0 = SBL0cs
. These
packets are then highly likely to queue at the bottleneck link
(the link for which Bcsi is minimal). Let min be the index of
the bottleneck link on the internet path Pcs . Following from
Equation 1, ∆n (measured by the server) is then given by:
∆n =
S
Bcsmin
+ d2Lmincs +
n∑
i=min+1
(d2Lics − d
1
Lics
) ,
where d2Lmincs refers to the additional queuing delay that is ex-
perienced by the second packet on the bottleneck link. Notice
that in the absence of cross-traffic, ∆n ≈ SBcsmin . If the server
immediately issues small replies to the packets sent by the
client (e.g., by issuing ACKs), then these packets are unlikely
to queue on the reverse path Psc , and the measured dispersion
between the reply packets will approximately correspond to
∆n [8]. As shown in [8], [18], the packet-pair dispersion is a
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Fig. 1. Sketch of our measurement setup. Our testbed comprises three NEC PF5240 OpenFlow hardware switches and one OpenVSwitch (version 2.3.1).
feature that is relatively stable over time (since it depends on
the bottleneck bandwidth of the path).
Case 2—Packets trigger rule installation: ∆n is typi-
cally in the order of tens of microseconds in current Internet
paths [19]. However, we expect ∆n to increase (e.g., to the
order of few milliseconds) if the probe packet pair triggered
an interaction on the control plane. This is mainly due to the
(relatively slow) handling of a notification by the controller.1
Namely, when the packet pair triggers an interaction on the
control plane, then:
∆n =
S
Bcsmin
+ d2Lmincs +
n∑
i=min+1
(d2Lics − d
1
Lics
) + max
∀k
δik .
Here, δik refers to the delay introduced by a possible commu-
nication between the controller and OpenFlow switch k on the
path between the sender and receiver. Since we assume that
the controller installs bi-directional rules on all switches at
once, only the maximum installation delay is accounted (and
is only witnessed when packets traverse Pcs ).
2) Round Trip Times (RTT): The RTT witnessed by a
packet i sent from the client to the server is:
RTT i =
n∑
j=1
(τLjcs + d
i
Ljcs
) +
m∑
j=1
(τLjsc + d
i
Ljsc
) + max
∀k
δik .
(2)
Clearly, if no communication between switch k and the con-
troller occurs (e.g., forwarding rules are already installed), then
δik = 0. Since there might be more than one OpenFlow switch
on Pcs , RTT i depends on the maximum latency incurred by a
switch-controller interaction across all the OpenFlow switches
included in Pcs .
Since the RTT exhibited by packets largely depends on the
geographical location of hosts, and on the underlying network
condition, we measure in our experiments the difference,
δRTT , between the RTT of two probe packets issued by the
same sender, i.e., δRTT = RTT 1 − RTT 2. This feature
does not depend on the location of hosts, but is mainly
1Before any packet is forwarded by the switch, it undergoes the following
steps: (i) the packet (or just its header) is transmitted to the controller; (ii)
the controller performs a table-lookup in order to invoke the corresponding
forwarding rule for the packet; (iii) the decision is transmitted to the involved
switch(es) in the form of a flow table entry; (iv) the switch installs the entry,
and, finally, the packet is forwarded by the switch.
dominated by rule installation overhead and network jitter.
Namely, following from Equation 2:
δRTT = max∀k
δ1k −max∀k δ
2
k +
n∑
j=1
di
Ljcs
+
m∑
j=1
di
Ljsc
,
where
∑n
j=1 d
i
Ljcs
+
∑m
j=1 d
i
Ljsc
is typically negligible. If both
packets do not result in any rule installation, then δRTT ≈ 0.
Otherwise, if one of the packets triggers a rule installation,
then |δRTT |  0, since max∀k δ1k  0 or max∀k δ2k  0.
C. Data Collection
To collect timing information based on our features, we
deployed 20 remote clients across the globe (cf. Table I) that
exchange UDP-based probe packet trains with the local server.
Notice that we rely on UDP for transmitting packets since
Internet gateways may filter TCP SYN or ICMP packets.
Each probe train consists of:
• A CLEAR packet signaling the start of the measurements.
Upon reception of this packet, the controller deletes all
the entries stored within the flow tables of the OpenFlow
switches in Pcs .
• After one second2 since the transmission of the CLEAR
packet, the client transmits four MTU-sized packet pairs.
Here, different packet pairs are sent with an additional
second of separation.
• After one second since the transmission of the last packet
pair, another CLEAR packet is sent to clear all flow tables.
• Two packets separated by one second finally close the
probe train.
We point out that all of our probe packets belong to the same
network flow, i.e., they are crafted with the same packet header.
For each received packet of every train, the local server issues
a short reply (e.g., a 64 bytes ACK). We maintain a detailed log
of the timing information relevant to the sending and reception
of the exchanged probe packets. When measuring dispersion,
we account for out-of-order packets; this explains negative
dispersion values.
For each of our 20 clients, we exchange 450 probe trains
on the paths Pcs and Psc to the server. Half of these probe
trains are exchanged before noon, while the remaining half is
exchanged in the evening. In our measurements, we vary the
number of OpenFlow switches that need to be configured in
2Our experimental results show that one second is enough to account for
rule installation on all four OpenFlow switches in our network.
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REMOTE CLIENTS USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS. BANDWIDTHS ARE BASED ON ESTIMATES FROM THE CLOUD PROVIDERS.
Location Profile Details
A
m
az
on
Europe
1-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 100-250 Mbps
1-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 100-250 Mbps
1-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 250 Mbps
2-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 250 Mbps
4-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 1 Gbps
Australia 1-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 100-250 Mbps2-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 250 Mbps
North America
1-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 100-250 Mbps
1-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 250 Mbps
4-core Intel Xeon 2.5 GHz CPU, 1 Gbps
A
zu
re
Europe
1-core AMD Opteron 2.1 GHz CPU, 30-40 Mbps†
2-core Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz CPU, 200 Mbps
8-core AMD Opteron 2.1 GHz CPU, 800 Mbps
1-core Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz CPU, 100 Mbps
4-core Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz CPU, 400 Mbps
Asia 1-core Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz CPU, 100 Mbps4-core Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz CPU, 400 Mbps
North America
1-core AMD Opteron 2.1 GHz CPU, 30-40 Mbps†
2-core Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz CPU, 200 Mbps
8-core AMD Opteron 2.1 GHz CPU, 800 Mbps
† These bandwidths were obtained using measurements.
reaction to the exchanged probe packets. Namely, we consider
the following four cases where a probe packets triggers the
reconfiguration of some of the OpenFlow switches: (1) one
hardware switch, (2) two hardware switches, (3) three hard-
ware switches, and (4) the software switch. We remark that
the choice of the configured hardware switches in our testbed
(cf. Figure 1) has no impact on the measured features since
we ensure that the remaining hardware switches have already
matching rules installed. Furthermore, we remark that packets
of a probe train only traverse the software switch in case (4),
i.e., when it is configured. In total, our data collection phase
lapsed from April 27, 2015 until October 27,2015, in which
869,201 probe packets were exchanged with our local server
using all clients/configurations, amounting to almost 0.66 GB
of data.
D. Evaluation Metric
We evaluate two hypotheses based on our features: (i) the
first hypothesis states that no rule installation was triggered by
our probe packets and (ii) the second hypothesis corresponds
to the conjecture that a rule was installed in reaction to our
probes. Here, there are two possible errors: false match and
false non-match. In our case, the former is equivalent to a
decision that no rule was installed, while in reality our probes
triggered the installation of a rule. The latter is equivalent to a
decision that a rule was installed, while in reality no rule was
installed. The False Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-match
Rate (FNR) represent the frequencies at which these errors
occur. The Equal Error Rate (EER), which is used as a single
metric for the accuracy of an identification system [13], is the
rate at which FMR and FNR are equal. In the sequel, we use
the EER to evaluate the effectiveness of our features.
We compute the EER as follows. We compute the Prob-
ability Distribution Function (PDF) of the measured values
of our features (across all configurations and clients location)
as described in Sections III-A and III-B. We then separate
the PDFs in two categories: (i) PDFN that contains all
measurements obtained when our probes did not trigger a rule
installation, and (ii) PDFY that contains those measurements
obtained when the probe packets caused a rule installation at
k OpenFlow switches (with k = 1, 2, 3 hardware switches or
k = 1 software switch). We then compute the rate of falsely
accepted and falsely rejected hypotheses given a threshold.
The measurements from PDFN that are above this threshold
indicate the number of false rejects (FNR), and measurements
from PDFY that are below the threshold indicate the number
of false accepts (FMR). Recall that the EER is the error rate
where FNR and FMR are equal. The value of the EER-based
threshold is our reference for an accept/reject decision. If the
value of a measurement is smaller than the threshold, then we
conjecture it belongs to PDFN ; otherwise, we conjecture that
it belongs to PDFY .
Note that EER values are between 0% and 100%. An EER
value for a feature close to 50% indicates that our hypotheses
cannot be distinguished from each other for the given feature.
In particular, the value 50% means that PDFN and PDFY
for the given feature completely overlap, and, based on the
feature, an adversary cannot distinguish at all whether a packet
triggered a rule installation. Conversely, EER values close to
0% and 100% indicate that our hypotheses are distinguishable
based on our features, i.e., the fingerprinting accuracy is high.
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS
In this section, we present and analyze our experimental
results using each of our proposed time-based features.
A. Packet-pair Dispersion Feature
In Figure 2, we show (i) the PDF of dispersion values
for which none of the packets of a pair triggered any rule
installation at the switches (referred to as PDFN ), and (ii)
the PDF of dispersion values for which the probes triggered a
rule installation (referred to as PDFY ).
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Fig. 2. Fingerprinting SDN networks (100 Mbps link) using packet-pair dispersions. In our plots, we assume a bin size of 250µs.
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Fig. 3. Fingerprinting SDN networks (1 Gbps link) using packet-pair dispersions. In our plots, we assume a bin size of 250µs.
Our results show that the sample mean of PDFY is con-
siderably greater than that of PDFN ; PDFY and PDFN are
significantly different at 1% according to t-test [45] when the
number k of OpenFlow hardware and software switches that
need to be configured varies between 1 and 3. This is mainly
due to the fact that the delay required for rule installation,
max∀k δik, acts as a strong distinguisher when measuring ∆n.
More specifically, our results show that across all locations the
obtained EER are approximately 1% for k = 2, 3 hardware
switches, 1.74% for k = 1 hardware switch, and 4.49% for
k = 1 software switch. For example, when k = 3 hardware
switches, the EER is calculated using a threshold of 1.43 ms;
that is, 98.92% of all measured values in PDFN are below
1.43 ms, and 98.92% of all measured values above 1.43 ms are
contained in PDFY .
As shown in Figure 3, our results are negligibly affected
by the data link bandwidth. Notably, the EER marginally
increases by almost 0.2% for k = 2, 3 hardware switches
when the bandwidth of the data link increases from 100 Mbps
to 1 Gbps. In this setting, the EER decreases by 0.5% when
k = 1 hardware or software switch.
B. RTT Feature
In Figure 4, we plot the PDF of δRTT values witnessed by
probe packets sent within a short time interval (i.e., by the
last two probes of our probe train sent 1 second apart) with
respect to a varying number of switches. Our results show that,
irrespective of the number of switches, the PDF of all δRTT
values collected by our clients for which neither of the two
probes triggered any rule installation on the switches (referred
to as PDFN ) can be fitted to a normal distribution with mean
0. In contrast, the sample mean of PDF of δRTT values for
which only the first probe (PDFY ) incurred a rule installation
is strictly greater than 0; PDFY and PDFN are significantly
different at 1% according to t-test. The EER is approximately
0.43% when k = 3 hardware switches, 0.13% when k = 2
hardware switches, 1.25% when k = 1 hardware switch, and
increases to 5.84% when k = 1 software switch.
Similar to the dispersion feature, our results are little
affected by the speed of the data link (cf. Figure 5). More
specifically, the EER was unchanged for k = 3 hardware
switches and marginally increased by almost 0.7% for k = 2, 1
hardware switches when the bandwidth of the data link in-
creases from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps. Given this change, the EER
increased by almost 1.5% when k = 1 software switch.
We also compute the EER for δRTT values measured over
a 10 minute span. As shown in Figure 6, our results indicate
that δRTT is not a stable feature over time; for example,
when k = 1, the EER deteriorates to approximately 5%
for a hardware switch, and almost 15% when dealing with
a software switch. To further study the stability of δRTT
over a longer period of time (three months), we conducted
a separate experiment using four of our nodes located in
Europe. Our results (cf. Figure 7) show that PDFN and
PDFY are considerably less distinguishable when RTT values
are collected over a larger time span; for example, the EER
grows to 39.5% for a time span of 3 months when k = 1
hardware switch (and to 25.17% and 24.83% when k = 2 and
k = 3, respectively). We believe that this discrepancy is due
to changing network conditions, which incur in non-negligible
differences in RTT [38]. Namely, our results suggest that the
change of the RTT value by a few milliseconds, caused by e.g.,
a change in the WAN path or traffic conditions, is comparable
to the change in the RTT value introduced by an interaction
with the controller.
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Fig. 4. Fingerprinting SDN networks (100 Mbps link) using δRTT . In our plots, we assume a bin size of 250µs.
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Fig. 5. Fingerprinting SDN networks (1 Gbps link) using δRTT . In our plots, we assume a bin size of 250µs.
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Fig. 6. Impact of the time span on the δRTT feature.
C. Summary of Results
Our evaluation results in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 show
that fingerprinting attacks on SDN networks are feasible; in
fact, they are already realizable using simple features such as
packet-pair dispersions and RTTs.
More specifically, our findings suggest that, irrespective of
the number of OpenFlow switches that need to be configured
in reaction to a given probe packet, the delay introduced by
rule installation, max∀k δik, provides an effective distinguisher
for an adversary to identify whether packets are only processed
on the fast data plane, or triggers an interaction with the
controller on the relatively slow software-based control plane.
This delay is clearly distinguishable using the packet-pair
dispersion, which is a stable feature over time, and is little
affected by the size of the network (i.e., by the number of
OpenFlow switches that need to be configured).
Although packet pairs can be easily crafted by an active
adversary, packet pairs might not always be extractable from
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Fig. 7. δRTT over a period of 3 months when k = 1 hardware switch. Here,
we assume a bin size of 250µs.
existing traffic by a passive adversary. However, a passive
adversary can monitor existing traffic for packets that share
a similar packet header, and are sent apart within a short time
interval (e.g., within 10 minutes).
Our findings show that the difference of measured RTT
values between two such packets provides evidence for a
passive adversary whether any of those packets triggered a re-
action on the control plane. Passive fingerprinting is especially
detrimental since it limits the applicability of existing intrusion
detection systems in detecting SDN fingerprinting attempts;
indeed, passive network monitoring does not generate any
extra traffic and as such cannot be deterred by relying on
anomaly detection. Notice, however, that the RTT feature
considerably depends on the SDN network size and is less
stable over time when compared to packet-pair dispersions.
For instance, the EER almost doubles in our experiments when
the number of OpenFlow hardware switches that need to be
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Fig. 8. Fingerprinting SDN networks with respect to the number of switches
and the data link bandwidth.
configured decreases from 3 to 1.
Our results also suggest that the data link bandwidth has
little impact on the fingerprinting accuracy for both the RTT
and the dispersion features. The presence of a software switch
in the communication path, however, considerably deteriorates
the EER; even in such a setting, our results nevertheless show
that fingerprinting attacks can still be reliably mounted by a
remote adversary.
Table II and Figure 8 summarize our results. We argue
that our findings apply to other SDN networks in which the
relative difference between the processing speed of packets
at the data plane, and at the control plane is even more
pronounced. Recall that our testbed was devised to emulate
a scenario that is particularly hard for fingerprinting. That is,
the controller’s CPU was idle most of the time during the
measurements; the controller used pre-computed rules when
issuing forwarding decision and was connected to a small
number of switches (i.e., three); at the time of writing, the
deployed OpenFlow hardware switches are among the fastest
in installing new flow rules; furthermore, we ensured that
the switches’ flow tables were empty when performing the
measurements, obtaining a flow rule installation time in the
order of milliseconds [25], [28]. Hence, it is clear that the
fingerprinting accuracy provided by our features only increases
when the controller is under heavy load, the data plane
bandwidth is larger (e.g., 10 Gbps), or the OpenFlow switches
require longer times to update their flow tables.
Note, however, that our findings rely on the assumption
that there is a single SDN network on the path to the server.
Otherwise, while our features still fingerprint controller-switch
interactions in more than one SDN network, they do not reveal
in which network the interactions take place.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In the previous section, we showed that remote fingerprint-
ing attacks on SDN networks are feasible and easily realizable
by means of our proposed features. In what follows, we
discuss the implications of our findings on the security of SDN
networks.
A. Rule Scanning
Based on our findings, a remote adversary can clearly infer
whether a flow rule has been already installed by the controller
in order to handle a specific type of traffic or route towards a
given destination. For example, the adversary can craft probe
packets whose headers match the traffic type and/or destination
address and infer by measuring the timing of the packets
whether these packets triggered the installation of a rule.
This provides a strong evidence for the adversary that e.g.,
communication with the given destination address has recently
occurred. Depending on the underlying rule, the adversary
might also be able to infer the used network protocol, and the
destination port address. By doing so, the adversary obtains
additional information about the occurrence of a particular
communication event; for example, the adversary can infer
whether the destination address has recently established an
SSL session to perform an e-banking transaction. Notice that
this leakage is only particular to SDN networks, and does not
apply to traditional networks.
Moreover, the remote fingerprinting of rules enables the
adversary to better understand the logic adopted by the con-
troller in managing the SDN network. This includes inferring
the timeouts set for the expiry of specific rules, whether the
controller aims at fine-grained or coarse-grained control in
the network, etc. Similar to existing port and traffic scanners,
this knowledge can empower the adversary with the necessary
means to compromise the SDN network. Even worse, the
adversary can leverage this knowledge in order to attack
other networks which implement a similar rule installation
logic. For instance, in a geographically dispersed datacenter,
different sub-domains typically implement the same policies.
The adversary can train using one sub-domain and leverage
the acquired knowledge in order to compromise another sub-
domain.
B. Denial-of-Service Attacks
The rule space is a scarce resource in existing hard-
ware switches. Namely, state-of-the-art OpenFlow hardware
switches can only accommodate few tens of thousands
rules [20], and only support a limited number of flow-table
updates per second [3], [25]. While these limitations can
be circumvented by means of a careful design of the rule
installation logic, an adversary that knows which packets cause
an interaction with the controller can abuse this knowledge to
launch Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
For instance, an adversary might simply try to overload the
controller with handling packet-in events. More specifically,
9TABLE II
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED EERS.
100 Mbps data link 1 Gbps data link
k = 3 HW k = 2 HW k = 1 HW k = 1 SW k = 3 HW k = 2 HW k = 1 HW k = 1 SW
Packet-pair Dispersion EER 1.08% 0.94% 1.74% 4.49% 1.24% 1.19% 1.25% 3.87%Threshold 1.43 ms 1.37 ms 1.17 ms 0.37 ms 1.42 ms 1.36 ms 0.88 ms 0.20 ms
δRTT , time span 1 second
EER 0.43% 0.13% 1.25% 5.84% 0.45% 0.84% 2.04% 7.25%
Threshold 4.63 ms 4.27 ms 2.13 ms 0.84 ms 4.60 ms 4.85 ms 2.18 ms 0.85 ms
the adversary sends packets, where each of them most likely
triggers a controller-switch interaction. Too many such inter-
actions will overload the controller.
Another kind of DoS attack is to fill up the switches’
flow tables. An analogy to this is when a computer runs
out of memory and starts swapping. Usually, the computer
becomes unusable. Similarly, the network performance is
severely harmed when the flow tables are full (or even almost
full). First, installing flow rules in an almost full table is more
costly than in an almost empty flow table. Second, in case
the flow table is full, either new network flows cannot be
established, which would already be a DoS, or some installed
flow rules need to be deleted. However, in general, it is not
obvious which rules should be deleted to make room for new
rules; this needs to be coordinated by the controller and is a
complex operation, which can quickly overload the controller
and the switches. For example, the deletion of a rule of
an ongoing network flow might entail the rule’s immediate
reinstallation. This can escalate and the controller will have to
constantly delete and reinstall rules.
An adversary can make both kinds of DoS attacks more
likely to succeed by first passively fingerprinting the network
traffic, instead of blindly guessing which packets trigger a
controller-switch interaction.
VI. PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we present an efficient countermeasure to
prevent fingerprinting attacks on SDN networks. We also
evaluate the effectiveness of our countermeasure in our testbed.
A. Our Countermeasure
One possible countermeasure against fingerprinting would
be for the switches to delay every received packet before
forwarding it. This countermeasure is clearly inefficient as it
would severely harm network performance. Randomly deleting
flow rules and reinstalling them when receiving the corre-
sponding packet-in events also does not solve the problem
either. First, additional interactions between the controller and
the switches are introduced, resulting in an additional burden
on the controller. Second, installing flow rules is a costly
switch operation. In what follows, we sketch an efficient
countermeasure, which relies on only delaying the first few
packets of a network flow.
Our proposal does not concern the handling of new flows,
but focuses on processing packets which pertain to existing
flows. Namely, for a packet of an existing flow, we leverage
the group table [31] and the internal timer maintained by a
switch to identify whether this flow has recently appeared.
The group tables are used in OpenFlow switches to describe
per-packet forwarding actions. They allow one to realize
forwarding strategies, such as ECMP [44], which could not be
achieved using the flow table abstraction that describes only
per-flow forwarding actions. A group table contains one or
more buckets, which in turn contain an action set, similar to
the one contained in the flow rules. A group table is further
associated with a bucket selection logic, which is related to
the group table type. For example, a group table of type “fast
failover” implements a selection logic that associates each
bucket to a switch’s port. Then, the logic selects the first bucket
in the table whose associated switch’s port status is live. The
action group in a flow rule’s action set enables one at selecting
which packets should be processed by which group.
Our proposed countermeasure (cf. Figure 9) defines a new
bucket selection logic for the group table, such that packets
of active flows are immediately forwarded, while packets of
inactive flows are forwarded onto a special port that connects
the switch to a network delay element. Our selection logic
considers a flow to be inactive if no packets for such a flow
were received by the switch in a threshold amount of time,
Tth, which is measured (in seconds) by the switch’s internal
timer.
The first received packet of an inactive flow is delayed by
δRTT ≈ max∀k δik, which gives the adversary little advantage
in identifying whether the additional delay measured by the
RTT feature is caused by a controller-switch interaction or is
artificially introduced by our countermeasure. Moreover, all
packets of the same flow received within a short time window
W are also delayed by a small ∆; this procedure prevents
fingerprinting attempts that leverage the dispersion feature. As
shown in Section VI-B, ∆ and δRTT can be fitted to pre-
determined distributions, depending on the network size and
the number of hops on the communication path. Alternatively,
the controller can estimate the distributions corresponding to
∆ and δRTT through a feedback loop.
Notice that our countermeasure is unlikely to deteriorate
network performance, since only few packets per flow are
delayed by few milliseconds (cf. Section VI-B). We further
remark that our proposal requires minor modifications—which
are supported to a large extent already in the OpenFlow v1.3
specification—by the switches’ manufacturers. As such, we
argue that our proposal can be efficiently implemented (in
hardware) within the switches.
B. Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed countermea-
sure using the tested described in Section III-C. For that
purpose, we connect a delay element, running on Intel Xeon
2.8 GHz CPU with 4 GB of RAM, to a reserved port on
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Fig. 9. Sketch of our countermeasure. The packets with destination IP 1.2.3.4 are processed by the group table 3, which implements the bucket selection
logic specified by our countermeasure. If no packets for this network flow are processed by the switch for a time T > Tth, then the next few packets of the
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Fig. 10. Modified testbed used to evaluate our countermeasure.
the outermost switch; as described later, this element delays
network packets by a specified amount before outputting them
back on another port of the switch (cf. Figure 10).
Since our countermeasure requires a modification to the
bucket selection logic by the switches’ manufacturers, we
emulate this logic by tagging the first few packets of inactive
flows, and by pre-installing a rule which forwards such tagged
packets to the delay element.
Packets are delayed by the delay element according to a
pre-determined distribution. To select the best-fit distribution,
we applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [24] on a num-
ber of candidate distributions, such as Pareto, Generalized
Pareto, Weibull, using our collected measurements as ground
truth. Our results show that the Generalized Pareto distribu-
tion achieves the highest Kolmogorov-Smirnov score test (of
approximately 0.09 for dispersion and 0.08 for δRTT ) for
both our investigated features (cf. Figure 11). Recall that the
Generalized Pareto distribution is of the form:
f(ξ,µ,σ)(x) =
1
σ
(
1 +
ξ(x− µ)
σ
)(− 1ξ−1)
Table III summarizes the parameters for Generalized Pareto
distributions extracted from our measurements, and used by
the delay element to prevent fingerprinting attempts using the
dispersion and the δRTT features. Namely, in our counter-
measure, the delay element inserts a delay before transmitting
the first packet by randomly sampling from a Generalized
Pareto distribution with parameters ξ = −0.53, σ = 10.58, and
µ = 0.57, while all subsequent packets sent within an interval
of 100 ms are delayed by randomly sampling from a General-
ized Pareto distribution with parameters ξ = −0.60, σ = 2.86,
and µ = 0.45 (to prevent fingerprinting using the dispersion
feature).
Results: In the remainder of this section, we report on the
effectiveness of our proposed countermeasure using the testbed
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Fig. 11. Fitting experimental data to the Generalized Pareto distribution.
shown in Figure 10. Here, we collect our measurements using
the same process described in Section III-C. Our results are
shown in Table IV.
Our results indicate that our countermeasure considerably
impacts the fingerprinting accuracy of a remote adversary
using the dispersion and δRTT features. More specifically,
our countermeasure increases the EER to almost 40% using
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TABLE III
PARAMETERS OF THE GENERALIZED PARETO DISTRIBUTIONS USED BY
THE DELAY ELEMENT.
ξ σ µ
Packet-pair Dispersion -0.60 2.86 0.45
δRTT -0.53 10.58 0.57
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF MEASURED EERS USING OUR COUNTERMEASURE.
k = 3 HW k = 2 HW k = 1 HW k = 1 SW
Packet-pair Dispersion 39.76% 46.25% 61.18% 84.57%
δRTT 33.42% 37.48% 67.19% 83.11%
the dispersion feature, and to 33% using the δRTT feature
when the network comprises three hardware switches. Our
countermeasure, however, increases the EER to almost 84%
(using both investigated features) when the network com-
prises a software switch. Recall that the worst attainable
fingerprinting accuracy in this case is when the EER is 50%
which signals that the two distributions PDFY and PDFN
completely overlap. In the case of a software switch, the
EER increases to 84% which means that the adversary has an
advantage in distinguishing PDFY from PDFN , in spite of
our countermeasure. We believe that this discrepancy mainly
originates from the fact that the estimated Generalized-Pareto
distribution does not emulate well delays corresponding to
software switches (cf. Figure 12).
Similarly, we also argue that lower fingerprinting accuracies
can be obtained with our countermeasure if the delay element
is equipped with fine-grained delay distributions with respect
to the different number of hardware switches that need to be
configured in the network. We validate this hypothesis in a
separate experiment. Here, we assume the delay element is
equipped with best-fit estimates of the distributions of rule
installation delays exhibited by both our features with respect
to the number of switches in the network, and we measure
the corresponding EER witnessed by a remote adversary in
our testbed (cf. Figure 10). Our results in Figure 13 confirm
our hypothesis, and show that when the delay element is
equipped with fine-grained information about the distributions
of rule installation delays in the network, the EER is closer
to 50%. For example, in this case, the EER increases to
almost 40% using both of our features when the network
comprises a software switch, and is almost 47% when two
hardware switches need to be configured. This shows that
our countermeasure considerably reduces the distinguishing
advantage of a remote adversary, when fine-grained delay
distributions are available to the delay element.
VII. RELATED WORK
This paper extends our prior work on fingerprinting SDN
networks [2]. The additional contributions are summarized
as follows. (i) Our evaluation shows that fingerprinting of
SDN networks with software switches is also feasible. (ii)
We also investigate the fingerprinting accuracy when the link
bandwidth increases to 1 Gbps. (iii) We conducted further
measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of fingerprinting
SDN networks over a substantial period of time. (iv) We
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Fig. 12. Software switch experimental delays vs. the Generalized Pareto
distribution.
discuss the implications of our findings on the security of
SDN networks. (v) Finally, we analyze and evaluate our
countermeasure.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss related work in
the areas of network fingerprinting and SDN security.
A. Network Fingerprinting
Network fingerprinting has attracted considerable attention
in the research community. Markopoulou et al. [26] show
that network delays in backbone networks are relatively stable
and are only marginally affected by network congestion.
Dischinger et al. [6] show that network features such as
bandwidth and delays mainly depend on the last-mile hops
in residential networks (e.g., due to ISP traffic shaping).
Schulman and Spring [37] extend this observation by showing
that end-to-end delays in residential networks are largely
affected by weather conditions. These findings confirm our
observation that the RTT is not a stable feature over time.
Packet-pair dispersion was first proposed to estimate avail-
able bandwidth [16], [21], [43] and the bottleneck bandwidth
of a network path [4], [9], [18], [19], [36]. Sinha et al. [42]
observe that the distribution of packet-pair dispersions can be
used to fingerprint the Internet paths. Karame et al. [18] show
that the packet-pair dispersion technique is a stable feature
which can be used to characterize Internet paths.
B. SDN Security
A comprehensive survey of security issues in SDN can be
found in [23].
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Fig. 13. Impact of the estimation of the delay distribution on the measured
EER.
Shin and Gu [39] briefly hint on the possibility of finger-
printing SDN networks by leveraging timing information of
the exchanged packets; however, in contrast to our work, their
study is not based on a real-world evaluation and does not
provide any metrics to quantify fingerprinting accuracy. So-
called topology attacks of SDN networks are studied in [5],
[15]. Dhawan et al. [5] also discuss DoS attacks, similar to the
ones outlined in Section V. They describe an extension of the
controller with a monitoring unit, which detects and reports
abnormal behavior.
Shin et al. [40] outline a number of vulnerabilities in
current SDN controllers such as Floodlight [12], Beacon [10],
OpenDaylight [30], and POX [34]; these vulnerabilities al-
low malicious applications to tamper with the internal data
structures maintained by the SDN controller in order to attack
the entire SDN network. The authors propose a sandbox
approach for network applications to deter this misbehav-
ior. Further mechanisms for securing the control plane are
proposed in [33]. Similarly, AVANT-GUARD [41] proposes
two data plane extensions to enhance the resilience of an
SDN network against network flooding attacks and expedite
access to critical data plane activity patterns. We point out
that these prior security solutions do not deter fingerprinting
attacks on SDN networks. To the best of our knowledge,
our countermeasure emerges as the only workable solution
to alleviate SDN fingerprinting attacks. Moreover, we are the
first to discuss information leakage concerning the packet-
forwarding logic in SDN.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the fingerprinting of SDN net-
works by a remote adversary. For that purpose, we collected
measurements from a large number of hosts located across the
globe using a realistic SDN network. Our evaluation shows
that, by leveraging information from the RTT and packet-pair
dispersion of the exchanged packets, fingerprinting attacks on
SDN networks succeed with overwhelming probability. Our
results also suggest that fingerprinting attacks are not restricted
to active adversaries, but can also be mounted by passive
adversaries that capture a snapshot of the traffic exchanged
with the SDN network.
Based on our results, we presented and evaluated a counter-
measure that leverages the switches’ group tables in order to
delay the first few packets of every flow. Our evaluation results
show that our countermeasure considerably reduces the ability
of an adversary to mount fingerprinting attacks against SDN
networks.
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